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Gaming Control Board Has Great Deference in
Granting Slot Licenses: Riverwalk Casino, L.P. v.
PennsylvaniaGaming Control Board
GAMING ACT - SLOT MACHINE LICENSING - QUASI-JUDICIAL
DELIBERATIONS - SUNSHINE ACT - The Supreme Court of Penn-

sylvania affirmed the Order and Adjudication of the Pennsylvania
Gaming Control Board which granted Category 2 slots licenses to
HSP Gaming and the Philadelphia Entertainment and Development Partners, holding, inter alia, that the Pennsylvania Gaming
Control Board was a quasi-judicial body entitled to hold private
deliberations.
Riverwalk Casino, L.P. v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 926 A.2d 926
(Pa. 2007).
The Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act 1
(Gaming Act) was passed in July 2004 and authorized slot machine gambling in Pennsylvania to provide tax relief to residents
through the gaming tax revenues. 2 The Gaming Act created the
Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board (Board) to set up and regulate this new industry in accordance with the Gaming Act. 3 The
Board, which was comprised of seven members, was also charged
4
with awarding the slot machine licenses throughout the state.
On February 1, 2007, the Board published an Order and Adjudication awarding slots licenses. 5 Petitioner Riverwalk Casino, L.P.
(Riverwalk), having not been awarded a slots license, filed a Peti6
tion for Review with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Riverwalk filed an application with the Board for a Category 2
Slot Machine License in the city of Philadelphia. 7 Under the
1.

4 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1101-1904 (West 2008).

2. Riverwalk Casino, L.P. v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 926 A.2d 926, 953 (Pa. 2007)
(Castille, J., dissenting).
3. Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 953 (Castille, J., dissenting).
4. Id. The President Pro Tempore of the Senate, the Minority Leader of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House, and the Minority Leader of the House were permitted to appoint
one member each to the Board. Id. The Governor was permitted to appoint three members
to the Board. Id.
5. Id. at 930 (majority opinion).
6. Id. at 931.
7. Id. at 930.
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Gaming Act, the Board is authorized to issue two Category 2 licenses in the city of Philadelphia. 8 In addition to Riverwalk, four
other organizations applied for a Category 2 license: Keystone Redevelopment Partners, PNK Pinnacle Entertainment, HSP Gaming LP, and Philadelphia Entertainment and Development Partners (PEDP).9
The five applications were reviewed by the Board pursuant to
the guidelines established in the Gaming Act. 10 As part of the application review process, public hearings were held April 10-12,
2006 for the applicants to present their plans and for members of
the community to comment publicly on these proposed plans."
Final licensing hearings were then conducted November 13-15,
2006, at which time the applicants were provided with an opportunity to present evidence to the Board, including but not limited
to witness testimony and documentary and demonstrative evidence, in support of their license applications. 12 Finally, the
Board set a deadline of December 8, 2006, for applicants to file a
written brief, and scheduled a public meeting for December 20,
2006, to vote on Category 2 slots license applications. 13
Ultimately, the Board voted to approve the applications submitted by HSP Gaming and PEDP and to deny the applications filed
by Riverwalk, Keystone Redevelopment Partners, and PNK Pinnacle Entertainment. 14 The decision by the Board to approve and
deny the respective applications for the Category 2 slots licenses
was explained in its Order and Adjudication, which it issued on
February 1, 2007.15
Unsatisfied with the Board's decision, and believing that the
Board erred in awarding licenses to HSP Gaming and PEDP,
Riverwalk filed a Petition for Review to challenge the Order and

8. Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 930. A Category 2 license permits the licensee to operate
slot machines in a stand-alone venue, a Category 1 license permits the use of slot machines
at horse racing tracks, and a Category 3 license authorizes slot machine use at resort hotels. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 930.
14. Id. Commissioner Joseph W. Marshall, III, voluntarily chose to recuse himself from
deliberating and voting on the application filed by Keystone Redevelopment Partners to
prevent a potential conflict of interest. Id. at 937. Likewise, Chairman of the Board Thomas A. Decker voluntarily chose to recuse himself from deliberating and voting on the
application for a Category 2 slots license submitted by HSP Gaming. Id.
15. Id. at 930.
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Adjudication on March 2, 2007.16 Pursuant to Section 1204 of the
Gaming Act, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has exclusive
jurisdiction over an appeal of the Board's Order and Adjudication. 17 On March 14, 2007, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
ordered that an oral argument be held in connection with the appeal. 18
Riverwalk's appeal raised seven issues, the first of which alleged that the Board violated the Sunshine Act 19 by conducting
private meetings to discuss the merits of the slots license applications. 20 Riverwalk further alleged that the Board made a determination of which applications it would approve and deny at a
private meeting, and that the Board vote at the December 20,
2006, public meeting was an attempt by the Board to legitimize a
21
decision that they had reached outside of the public eye.
While the Board admitted to holding a private executive session
prior to the December 20, 2006, meeting, it argued that such a
meeting was legitimate by way of the Sunshine Act and the holding of Kennedy v. Upper Milford Township Zoning Hearing
Board.22 In Kennedy, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found
that a zoning hearing board fulfilled a quasi-judicial role because
it was a fact-finder and it engaged in deliberations that were similar to those of a court. 23 As such, the court held that it was appropriate for a zoning hearing board to deliberate privately. 24
Chief Justice Cappy, writing for the majority in Riverwalk, recognized that while the open meeting requirement of the Sunshine
Act applied to the Board generally, there were exceptions enumerated in the Act that needed to be considered. 25 Riverwalk argued
16. Id. at 931.
17. Id. at 929. The Gaming Act states that "[t]he Supreme Court of Pennsylvania shall
be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction to consider appeals of any final order, determination or decision of the board involving the approval, issuance, denial or conditioning
of a slot machine license." 4 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1204 (West 2008).
18. Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 931.
19. 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 704 (West 2000).
20. Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 931. The Sunshine Act states that "[o]fficial action and
deliberations by a quorum of the members of an agency shall take place at a meeting open
to the public, with exceptions for executive sessions." 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 704 (West
2000).
21. Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 931.
22. Id. at 934 (citing Kennedy v. Upper Milford Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 834 A.2d
1104 (Pa. 2003)).
23. Kennedy, 834 A.2d at 1115-16.
24. Id.
25. Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 932. Exceptions to the general open meeting requirement
include 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 707, 708, and 712 (West 2000), which discuss, respectively, exceptions to open meetings, exceptions concerning executive sessions, and excep-
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that there was no sound basis to suggest the Board was a quasijudicial body and that even if it was to be considered as such, Congress did not intend for all deliberations of a quasi-judicial body to
be held in private. 26
Relying in part on Man 0' War Racing Association v. State
Horse Racing Commission,27 however, the majority disagreed and
held that the Board performed a quasi-judicial role in fact-finding
and deliberating in connection with awarding the slot machine
licenses.28
Like the State Horse Racing Commission, Justice Cappy reasoned that the Board must engage in fact-finding and then consider a great deal of information, including confidential information, pertaining to applicants and their respective applications
before they can weigh the relative strengths of each and make a
final determination. 29 To that end, private deliberations were not
only permissible, but necessary for Board members openly to discuss all elements of a candidate's application, and still protect confidential information with which the Board was entrusted during
the application process. 30 These complicated deliberations required the Board to balance and weigh a multitude of facts in order to determine which applicants were best suited to receive the
slots licenses. 31 The majority concluded that this level of deliberation by the Board rose to the level of a quasi-judicial operation and
therefore was squarely within the open meeting exception of the
Sunshine Act. 32
tions relating to General Assembly meetings. Id. Specifically applicable to the immediate
situation was, as the Board had cited, 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 708(a)(5) (West 2000),
which permits an agency to hold an executive session not open to the public where the
matters to be discussed would lead to an unlawful disclosure of privileged or confidential
information or are a part of quasi-judicial deliberations. Id.
26. Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 932.
27. 250 A.2d 172 (Pa. 1969). The issue before the court in Man O' War was whether an
appeal could be taken from a decision rendered by the State Horse Racing Commission,
which was charged with granting four licenses to conduct horse racing meetings. Man 0'
War, 250 A.2d at 174. The court held that an appeal could be taken as a result of the judicial characteristics of the State Horse Racing Commission, which were evident in the complicated statutory provisions from which they were to make a judicial decision regarding
which applicants would be awarded a license. Id. at 175.
28. Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 934-35. The majority relied upon the Man 0' War court's
distinction between agencies who apply "multi-faceted statutory standards" in considering
licensees from other agencies, such as those responsible for occupational licensing, who only
seek to determine whether an applicant has met defined minimum standards. Id. at 935
(quoting Man O War, 250 A.2d at 175).
29. Id. at 935.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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The second issue Riverwalk raised on appeal was whether
Board members were permitted to deliberate and vote on less than
every application. 33 At the Board meeting on December 20, 2006,
Board Commissioner Joseph W. Marshall announced that he had
voluntarily recused himself from deliberations and voting on the
license application filed by Keystone Redevelopment. 34 Chairman
of the Board Thomas A. Decker also decided that, in order to avoid
a potential conflict of interest, he would voluntarily recuse himself
35
from deliberations and voting on HSP Gaming's application.
Both members, after consulting with the Board's Chief Counsel,
determined that their recusal from one application did not prohibit them from deliberating and voting on the other applica36
tions.
Riverwalk contended that since the licenses were to be awarded
to the two best applicants, the Board was required to compare
each of the applicants.3 7 If all seven members voted on one applicant, Riverwalk argued, and only six voted on another applicant,
then the relative chance of each applicant being awarded a license
was affected.3 8 Riverwalk further alleged that this process provided recused Board members the opportunity to prejudice other
Board members. 39 Therefore, Riverwalk sought for the matter to
be remanded back to the Board for a fair and impartial hearing in
which Commissioner Marshall and Chairman Decker would not
40
participate.

33. Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 935. "Riverwalk next asserts that the Board's decision
should be vacated because Board members who had recused themselves from deliberating
and voting on individual license applications were not disqualified from considering the
remaining applications." Id.
34. Id. at 937. Commissioner Marshall recused himself to avoid a potential conflict of
interest between his role as a member on the Board and his role as Chairman/CEO of Temple University Health System. Id. Temple University Health System was in the middle of
an arbitration with Preferred Real Estate over disputed matters concerning a lease between the two parties. Id. Preferred Real Estate and its owner, Michael O'Neill, were
required to file documents with the Board on behalf of Keystone Redevelopment Partners,
LLC, as a part of Keystone's application. Id.
35. Id. Chairman Decker was the managing partner of Cozen O'Connor prior to being
appointed to the Board. Id. at 938. After Chairman Decker left Cozen O'Connor, the firm
provided HSP with legal assistance in connection with their slots license application. Id.
Even though Chairman Decker reported that he had performed no legal service for HSP,
and neither he nor his family benefited in any way from the legal services provided, he
voluntarily recused himself to avoid the appearance of impropriety. Id.
36. Id. at 937-38.
37. Id. at 938.
38. Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 938.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 935.
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In addressing the second issue, the majority considered prior
drafts of the Gaming Act that proposed language requiring any
member who disqualified himself from deliberating or voting on
an application to recuse himself from deliberating and voting on
all applications for that license category. 4 1 The majority reasoned
that the prior draft was evidence that such a strategy was considered by the legislature. 42 The General Assembly, however did not
accept this provision and instead chose language permitting a
member to participate in the remaining matters before the
43
Board.
Furthermore, the majority cited the established rule from Street
44
Road Bar & Grille, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board
that gives an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute
controlling weight unless it is clearly wrong. 4 5 In line with that
rule, the court rejected Riverwalk's argument and held that
Chairman Decker and Commissioner Marshall were not required
to refrain from taking part in the deliberations and voting in connection with the applications that were not associated with their
recusals. 46 Additionally, the court found no validity in Riverwalk's argument that Chairman Decker or Commissioner Marshall influenced the opinions of the other members by recusing
themselves from individual applications. 47 Such an allegation
amounted to mere speculation, the majority determined, as no
proof was offered to suggest that the remaining Board members
were unable to assess each application on the merits independ48
ently.
Riverwalk next asserted that the Order and Adjudication by the
Board should be vacated because the Board concluded two casinos
could not coexist in the North Delaware Avenue region, without
having evidence to support such a theory. 49 The decision, Riverwalk contended, was arbitrary, and Riverwalk was never advised
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.at 940.

Id.
Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 940.
876 A.2d 346 (Pa. 2005).
Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 940-41 (citing Street Road Bar & Grille, 876 A.2d 346).
Id.

47. Id. at 940.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 944. Riverwalk's proposed site and those of HSP/Sugarhouse and Pinnacle/PNK were located in what the Board referred to as the North Delaware Avenue region.
Id. This encompassed land "East of Route 95, north of the Benjamin Franklin Bridge, and
between North Columbus Blvd.fNorth Delaware Avenue and the Delaware River. Id. (citing the Board's Order and Adjudication at 82).
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of the concern and thus was unable to present evidence to the contrary. 50
The Board claimed it was not provided with enough evidence to
conclude the North Delaware Avenue region was capable of handling the amount of traffic that would have been created by two
casinos. 51 Furthermore, the Board contended that Riverwalk focused solely on traffic, and failed to take into consideration the
impact of adding two casinos to the same community. 52
The court recognized that each applicant was to provide the
Board with a local impact report designed to address the impact of
building a casino in a particular neighborhood. 53 While each applicant submitted these reports as they pertained to their own casino, none of the three applicants who sought to build at the North
Delaware Avenue area detailed the impact of their own casino in
addition to that of another casino. 54 To aid it in making a more
informed decision, the Board hired a traffic expert to advise it in
connection with selecting casino sites.55
Based on their own findings and the advice of the traffic expert,
the Board determined that the North Delaware Avenue area was
advantageous because of the highway access to Interstate 95,
which also separated the casino from residential areas. 56 The
Board was concerned, however, by the potential impact of locating
two casinos in this area because of the additional traffic and the
57
overall impact it would have on the neighborhood.
The Board's concerns were further amplified when, at a Public
Input Hearing in April 2006, they received multiple comments
from individuals, community organizations, and public figures
urging it not to license two casinos in the North Delaware Avenue
region. 58 Based on the evidence gathered from applicants' reports,
the traffic expert, and community input, the Board felt it would be
doing the community a great disservice by licensing two casinos in
59
the North Delaware Avenue region.
50. Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 945-46.
51. Id. at 946.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 944. The local impact report was to address such issues as the impact on
transportation (including traffic studies highlighting adverse impacts), water/sewer service,
emergency services, and tourism. Id.
54. Id. at 946.
55. Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 944. The traffic expert retained was Edwards & Kelcey. Id.
56. Id. at 945.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 947.
59. Id. at 946-47.
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The court found there was sufficient evidence in the record to
indicate that the Board considered a multitude of evidence when
they determined that licensing two casinos in the same neighborhood would have a negative impact. 60 This evidence properly included the information that the Board received from Public Input
Hearings in accordance with Cashdollar v. State Horse Racing
Commission,61 which held that the Horse Racing Commission was
correct in relying on community comments during a public hearing
to gauge the impact an off-track betting facility would have on the
community.62 Additionally, the majority reasoned that no evidence in the record indicated Riverwalk's application was denied
because they failed to submit a traffic study outlining the result of
63
two casinos operating in the North Delaware Avenue area.
The court therefore held that since the Board selected the applicants with the best proposal, giving consideration to what was in
the public's best interest and not using any applicant's failure to
report on the impact of multiple casinos in a neighborhood, Riverwalk's claim failed. 64 The court affirmed the Board's Order and
Adjudication which granted a Category 2 slots license to HSP and
65
PEDP.
Justice Castille wrote a dissenting opinion in which he disagreed with the majority that the Board's Order and Adjudication
should be affirmed. 66 Justice Castille argued that that while the
majority may have been correct in finding the Board's deliberations were quasi-judicial, there was no reason that the Board
could not have been more open in deliberating over the applications. 67 A more open approach, Justice Castille argued, would
have prevented many of Riverwalk's procedural complaints, in60. Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 947.
61. 600 A.2d 646 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
62. Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 947 (citing Cashdollar,600 A.2d at 650).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 948.
65. Id. at 952. In addition to the those issues raised by Riverwalk discussed supra,
Riverwalk contended that PEDP lied to the Board when it said it did not have an interest
in Atlantic City gambling. Id. at 941. The court found that PEDP's representatives did not
lie concerning their involvement in Atlantic City gaming. Id. at 944. Riverwalk also alleged that the Board failed to consider the City of Philadelphia's support for Riverwalk's
application, which was a violation of their due process rights. Id. at 948. The majority
found that the letter was submitted after the deadline for submissions and they held not
only that the Board had the ability to set deadlines for public comment, but that its decision to evaluate only evidence which was present in the record in determining the best
overall proposal was reasonable. Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 949. The Board found that all
claims made by Riverwalk lacked merit. Id. at 952.
66. Id. at 953 (Castille, J., dissenting).
67. Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 954 (Castille, J., dissenting).
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cluding the traffic issue and the due process claim. 68 Justice Castille further argued that the Board's decision to adopt a policy
whereby the selection of one applicant in the North Delaware
Avenue area required the rejection of other applications in that
area indicated a clearly dispositive conclusion, and as the deliberations of the Board occurred in private, it is unknown how much
of a role this factor played in their voting.69 Finally, Justice Castille stated his belief that when the evaluation process involves a
comparative analysis of multiple applicants, a recusal from one
should be a recusal from all. 70
Approximately five months after the Gaming Act was signed
into law, a group of individuals, organizations, and legislators
filed a lawsuit alleging that Act 71 (the Gaming Act) was unconstitutional. 71 The petitioners' primary argument was that Act 71
had been amended so extensively through the legislative enactment process that it violated multiple provisions of Article III of
the Pennsylvania Constitution.72
The Gaming Act was first introduced in February 2004 as
House Bill 2330. 73 At the outset, HB 2330 was drafted to provide
the Pennsylvania State Police with the duty of performing criminal background checks of those persons seeking to acquire a license from the State Harness and Horse Racing Commission and
was a total of one page in length.7 4 After several revisions and
amendments by the House and the Senate, the bill became 145
pages in length, created the Board, provided for a means by which
to issue gaming licenses for slot machine casinos, and established

68. Id.
69. Id. at 955-56.
70. Id. at 956.
71. Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund v. Pennsylvania, 877 A.2d 383,
390 (Pa. 2005).
72. Pennsylvanians Against Gambling, 877 A.2d at 392. Specifically, the petitioners
charged that Act 71 was passed in violation of Article III, Sections 1, 3, 4, 6, and 10 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, which govern the enactment of legislation. Id. Section 3 was
designed to prevent the practice of "logrolling," or inserting numerous distinct matters into
one piece of legislation, particularly when no single issue could on its own obtain the approval of the legislature. Id. at 394. In addition to the Article III challenges, petitioners
alleged that the Gaming Act provided for an unconstitutional delegation of power to the
Gaming Control Board. Id. at 392.
73. H.R. 2330, 188th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2004). House Bill 2330 was titled
"An Act Providing for the Duties of the Pennsylvania State Police Regarding Criminal
History Background Reports for Persons Participating in Harness or Horse Racing." Id.
74. Id. The granting of licenses by the State Harness and Horse Racing Commission is
governed by the Race Horse Industry Reform Act of 1981, 4 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 325.101-.402
(West 2008).
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numerous funds. 75 The title of the bill was also amended to ex76
press the multitude of changes.
In determining whether Act 71 met the requirements of Article
III, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania employed a two-prong
test. 77 The first prong required the court to determine whether
the purpose of the original bill matched the purpose of the final
bill, and the second prong required the court to determine whether
the final bill and its title, when considered together, were deceptive.7 8 Ultimately, the court held that the original purpose of the
bill was to regulate gaming and that the subsequent amendments
did not alter that original purpose. 79 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the title of the final bill was clear enough to notify a
80
reasonable person as to the subject matter of the bill.
While the majority of Act 71 was ultimately upheld, the court
found several provisions to violate the Pennsylvania Constitution,
and therefore severed them from the Act. 81 The court determined
that transferring money from the State Gaming Fund to the Volunteer Fire Company Grant Program and the Forest Reserves
Municipal Financial Relief Law violated the single subject requirement of Article III, Section 3, as these organizations lacked a
82
clear connection to the primary objective of regulating gaming.
Additionally, the court agreed with the petitioners that the powers

75. H.R. 2330, 188th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2004) (as amended by Senate July 1,
2004). The funds created by Act 71 included the Gaming Fund, the Pennsylvania Horse
Race Fund, the Gambling and Economic Development and Tourism Fund, the Property Tax
Relief Fund, and a Compulsive and Problem Gambling Treatment Fund. Id.
76. Id.

77. PennsylvaniansAgainst Gambling, 877 A.2d at 408.
78. Id. at 408-09.
79. Id. at 409.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 403. Taking into consideration Section 1902(a) of Act 71, the court found that
it was able to separate the invalid provisions from the rest of the Act. Id. That section
reads:
(a) General rule.-Except as provided in subsection (b), the provisions of this
part are severable. If any provision of this part or its application to any person
or circumstances is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions
or applications of this part which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
(b) Limitation.-If any of the provisions of section 1201 (relating to Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board established) or 1209 (relating to slot machine license fee) or their application to any person or circumstance are held to be invalid by any court, the remaining provisions of this part and its application
shall be void.
4 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1902 (West 2008).

82. Pennsylvaniansagainst Gambling, 877 A.2d at 403.
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granted to the Board in connection with resolving zoning issues
83
were unconstitutional.
A provision not challenged in PennsylvaniansAgainst Gambling
on constitutional grounds, but of importance in the present case, is
Section 1201.1(a)(3) of the Gaming Act, which requires the Board
to adhere to the Sunshine Act.8 4 While the majority in Riverwalk
found the Board to be exempt from the open meeting requirement
while conducting quasi-judicial deliberations on the license applications, Justice Castille, in his dissent, argued that the Board
should have conducted the deliberations in public.8 5 In line with
Justice Castille's dissent, quasi-judicial bodies have not always
been exempt from the open meeting requirements of the Sunshine
Act in Pennsylvania, as is evidenced in In re Emmanuel Baptist
86
Church.
In Emmanuel Baptist Church, a church applied to a township
zoning board for a special building permit variance that would
allow them to construct church facilities on land zoned for mechanical uses. 87 The zoning board made its decision to deny the
application through a series of phone calls between the board
members, and not at a public meeting.8 8 The church appealed the
decision of the zoning board, and argued, inter alia, that the zoning board had violated the Sunshine Act. 89
The 1974 Open Meeting Law required that formal action of an
agency be taken at a meeting open to the public, or such action
would not be valid. 90 The term "agency" was defined very broadly

83. Id. at 419. Act 71 gave the Board power to override local zoning ordinances, which
the petitioners equated to a super zoning board with unlimited discretion. Id. at 415-16.
While the Board was required to make available a 60-day comment period for the public on
the location of a casino, they were not required make a decision based on this input. Id. at
416. The court concluded that the General Assembly failed to provide the board with the
requisite standards to resolve local zoning and land use problems and thus did not comply
with Article II, Section I of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at 419.
84. 4 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1201.1(a)(3) (West 2008).
85. Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 954 (Castille, J., dissenting).
86. 364 A.2d 536 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976), superseded by statute, Sunshine Act of 1986,
No. 84, 1986 Pa. Laws 388 (1986), as recognized in Kennedy v. Upper Milford Twp. Zoning
Hearing Bd., 834 A.2d 1104 (Pa. 2003).
87. Emmanuel Baptist Church, 364 A.2d at 537.
88. Id.
89. Id. (citing Open Meeting Law of 1974, 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 261-269 (West
1974), repealed by Sunshine Act of 1986, No. 84, 1986 Pa. Laws 388 (1986)).
90. Id. at 538-39. The relevant section of the Open Meeting Law read: "[tihe meetings
or hearings of every agency at which formal action is scheduled or taken are public meetings and shall be open to the public at all times. No formal action shall be valid unless
such formal action is taken during a public meeting." 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 262 (West
1974), repealed by Sunshine Act of 1986, No. 84, 1986 Pa. Laws 388 (1986).

550

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 46

and only expressly exempted the judiciary from its scope. 9 1 The
Township argued that the actions of its zoning board were quasijudicial in nature and therefore fell within the judiciary exception
93
to the open meeting requirement. 92 The court disagreed.
Citing Canney v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua
County, 94 the court adopted the reasoning of the Supreme Court of
Florida, and held that a government agency acting in a quasijudicial nature was not a part of the judiciary and therefore was
not excluded from the open meeting requirement. 95 The court further held that the act of the zoning board to deny the church's application for a variance by way of a telephone conversation between board members violated the Open Meeting Law. 96
The Emmanuel Baptist Church decision was described as the
leading case on the extent to which zoning boards were required to
97
operate under the terms of the Sunshine Act in Pennsylvania.
That is, it was the leading case until the General Assembly of
Pennsylvania amended the Sunshine Act and the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in Kennedy v. Upper Milford Township Zoning
Hearing Board found that the holding in Emmanuel Baptist
Church was no longer representative of the legislative intent of
98
the 1998 Sunshine Act.
In Kennedy, the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission applied to
a zoning hearing board to obtain relief to increase the height of a
communications tower from 120 feet to 200 feet. 99 In considering
the Turnpike Commission's application, the zoning board recessed
after it heard evidence and argument on the matter.100 Following
the recess, the zoning board reconvened and offered a new proposal which would permit the Turnpike Commission to build a
new tower at a height of 180 feet, which they then approved. 10 1
The Kennedys, who opposed the increase in tower height, filed a
claim alleging that the zoning board violated the Sunshine Act
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Emmanuel Baptist Church, 364 A.2d at 539.
Id.
Id.
278 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1973).
Emmanuel Baptist Church, 364 A.2d at 540 (citing Canney, 278 So.2d at 263-64).
Id. at 541-42.
Kennedy v. Upper Milford Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 834 A.2d 1104, 1119 (Pa.

2003) (citing EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING & PLANNING §

57.71 (1975)).
98. Kennedy, 834 A.2d at 1120.
99. Id. at 1106.
100. Id. at 1108.
101. Id. at 1112-13.
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when it recessed and conducted deliberations on the application
outside of public view. 0 2 The zoning board contended that it conducted quasi-judicial deliberations during the recess, which were
excluded from the open meeting requirement by Section 708 of the
03
Sunshine Act.'
The court determined that a zoning hearing board fulfilled a
quasi-judicial function, given its need to engage in fact-finding and
deliberative functions that were often similar to those of a
court.104 The court reasoned that given this role, the public interest was best served if the zoning board could exchange ideas and
opinions freely and that the best way to accomplish that was if
they deliberated privately.105 This conclusion was consistent, the
court concluded, with the intent of the legislature in amending the
Sunshine Act to exclude quasi-judicial deliberations from the open
0 6
meeting requirement.
The issues raised in Riverwalk were matters of first impression
for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, yet they were resolved by
the majority in a largely predictable manner. This was a result of
the standard by which the court was required to review the case.
The Gaming Act requires the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to
"affirm all final orders, determinations, or decisions of the board
involving . . .a slot machine license unless it shall find that the
board committed an error of law or that the order, determination
or decision of the board was arbitrary and there was capricious
10 7
disregard of the evidence."'
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has determined that an
agency capriciously disregards evidence when it willfully and deliberately disregards competent and relevant evidence that a person of ordinary intelligence would have to consider to resolve an
102. Id. at 1108.
103. Kennedy, 834 A.2d at 1113. Section 708 of the Sunshine Act, entitled "Executive
Session," reads in pertinent part:
(a)Purpose-An agency may hold an executive session for one or more of the
following reasons:
(5) To review and discuss agency business which, if conducted in public,
would violate a lawful privilege or lead to the disclosure of information or
confidentiality protected by law, including matters related to the initiation and conduct of investigations of possible or certain violations of the
law and quasi-judicial deliberations.
65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 708 (West 2000).
104. Kennedy, 834 A.2d at 1114.
105. Id. at 1115-17.
106. Id. at 1120.
107. 4 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1204 (West 2008).
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issue.108 Furthermore, the determination of an administrative
agency is given "great deference," and, therefore, relief is rarely
granted because an appellate tribunal should not merely enter its
own judgment in place of the judgment of the lower tribunal.10 9
While it would be wrong to permit an appellate tribunal arbitrarily to replace a lower tribunal's judgment with its own, it
would be equally wrong to establish an appeals process whereby
an appellate tribunal can do little more than rubber stamp the
decision of the lower tribunal. With respect to the present case,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has exclusive jurisdiction to
hear appeals of Board decisions regarding the granting of slots
licenses. 1 10 Yet, unless the court determines that the Board violated the law or deliberately did not consider relevant evidence,
the Gaming Act requires that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
affirm the decision of the Board.
Justice Castille acknowledged in his dissenting opinion that the
Gaming Act was passed largely to provide the citizens of Pennsylvania with tax relief."' To that end, an argument can be made
that the Gaming Act seeks to create an expeditious licensing process because revenue cannot be generated until casinos are licensed
and operational. Therefore, board members are appointed by individual politicians rather than being elected by citizens or the
legislature, and the appeals taken by unsuccessful applicants are
resolved as quickly as possible.
In vesting exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania and then binding their hands with such a limited
scope of review, the legislature has seriously limited the ability of
unsuccessful applicants to successfully appeal a decision by the
Board. After all, the Board does not need to show what weight, if
any, it afforded to the relevant evidence; it only needs to show that
it considered the relevant evidence. As the court in Riverwalk
found the Board to be exempt from the open meeting requirement
of the Sunshine Act, the Board is free to deliberate on the relative
merits of each application outside of the public eye.11 2 Without
public scrutiny of the deliberative process, the court will have little definitive proof beyond the Board's records of whether the
108. Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 929 (citing Arena v. Packaging Sys. Corp., 507 A.2d 18, 20
(Pa. 1986)).
109. Id. (citing Wintermyer v. WCAB (Marlowe), 812 A.2d 478, 484 (Pa. 2002)).
110. 4 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1204 (West 2008).
111. Riverwalk, 926 A.2d at 953 (Castille, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 935 (majority opinion).
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Board deliberately failed to consider relevant evidence when considering slots applications. Without such proof, and unless it is
clear the Board violated the law, its decision must be affirmed.
The impact of Riverwalk extends far beyond whether Riverwalk
will have the ability to operate a slots casino in Pennsylvania.
Riverwalk is a beacon of light which serves to illuminate the great
discretion that the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board has in
awarding slots licenses in Pennsylvania and the lack of authority
that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has been given to check
that power.
Brock E. McCandless

